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Insurance
by Bradley S. Wolff
Stephen Schatz"
and Stephen L. Cotter**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In property insurance cases,1 there were two Georgia Supreme Court
decisions with the potential for significant impact.2 The court held that
insurance companies are liable for diminution in value of real property
under commercial and homeowners insurance policies, extending the
reasoning in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mabry3
Answering a certified
beyond motor vehicles for the first time.4
one-year
suit limitation in a
court
also
held
a
question, the supreme
homeowners insurance policy is enforceable for losses not caused by fire,

* Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & IHiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1983); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Defense Research Institute; International
Association of Defense Counsel
** Managing Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia.
University ofVirginia (BA, with distinction, 1985); University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill School of Law (J.D., 1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Member, Tort and
Insurance Practice and Litigation); Defense Research Institute.
*** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (BA, 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1974). Member, Mercer Law Review (1973-1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia;
American Bar Association; Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; Defense Research
Institute; International Association of Defense Counsel.
1. For an analysis of Georgia insurance law during the prior survey period, see Stephen
M. Schatz, et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 63 MERCER L. REV. 165 (2011).
2. Royal Capital Dev. LLC v. Maryland Cas. Co., 291 Ga. 262, 728 S.E.2d 234 (2012);
White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 291 Ga. 306, 728 S.E.2d 685 (2012).
3. 274 Ga. 498, 556 S.E.2d 114 (2001). For a discussion of the decision in Mabry, see
Bradley S. Wolff, et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 54 MERCER L. REv. 341,
342-46 (2002).
4. Royal Capital Dev., 291 Ga. at 267, 728 S.E.2d at 238.
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despite an insurance commissioner-issued regulation that would prohibit
any limitation shorter than, two years.5
Despite an insurer's plea that it faced irreconcilable conflicting
obligations, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an insurer faced with
a time limit, policy-limit demand, and a hospital lien cannot escape
liability to the hospital by paying its policy limits to the injured party,
but an insurer might create a "safe harbor" from bad-faith liability
where the claimant unreasonably refuses to assure the satisfaction of the
lien, and the insurer satisfies the lien and pays any remaining proceeds
to the claimant.6
In a case now pending before the supreme court, the court of appeals
held that when a property owner and construction companies enter into
a contract requiring each construction contractor and subcontractor to
obtain liability insurance and other insurance coverage for the construction project to be provided by the owner for the benefit of all participants
in the project, the owner and contractors can all be held liable for the
damages caused to a construction worker, injured on the job, by a
subcontractor who failed to procure the required liability insurance.7
An insurance carrier's attempt to deny coverage based on a defense
not articulated in its reservation-of-rights letter was rejected by the
supreme court, despite the carrier's inclusion of a "catch-all" clause.'
The court held that insurers may not both deny a claim on stated
grounds and reserve the right to add other policy defenses later.9
Insureds who failed to cooperate with their insurer's investigation of
claims or defense of suits and to provide timely notice to their carriers
generally fared poorly in a number of cases decided during the survey
period.
In the automobile insurance arena, the court of appeals considered
several fact patterns presenting a question of whether injuries arose out
of the "use" of an automobile ° An insured who had rejected umbrellapolicy uninsured motorist (UM) coverage in writing was allowed to
recover UM benefits because his insurer required the UM coverage of
any underlying policy be equal to the liability limits before it would

5. White, 291 Ga. at 309, 728 S.E.2d at 687-88.
6. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Wellstar Health Sys., Inc., 315 Ga. App. 26, 34, 726
S.E.2d 488, 495 (2012).

7. Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta, 312 Ga. App. 599, 607-08, 719 S.E.2d 7, 14-15
(2012).
8. Hoover v. Maxum Indemnity Co., 291 Ga. 402,405, 730 S.E.2d 413, 417 (2012).

9. Id. at 405, 730 S.E.2d at 417.
10. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Myers, 316 Ga. App. 152,728 S.E.2d 787
(2012); Dunn-Craft v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 314 Ga. App. 620, 724 S.E.2d 903
(2012); Mough v. Progressive Max Ins. Co., 314 Ga. App. 380, 724 S.E.2d 414 (2012).
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allow UM coverage in an umbrella policy, which was held to be an
impermissible condition prior to the 2009 statutory amendment that
made umbrella UM coverage optional." When several eyewitnesses to
a fatal incident presented different versions of what occurred in a nocontact "John Doe" case, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory
corroboration requirement.' And where a known tortfeasor could not
be found and publication service was accomplished, a voluntary
dismissal of the lawsuit in which the UM carrier was served led to the
plaintiff's inability to bring a renewal action after the expiration of the
statute of limitations because she could no longer obtain a judgment
against the tortfeasor due to the absence of personal service in the
original action. 3
II.
A.

FiRST-PARTY PROPERTY INSURANCE

Recovery for Diminution in Value

In 2001, the Georgia Supreme Court held in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mabry 4 that an automobile insurance
policy covers not only the cost to repair the damaged vehicle but also the
diminution in value of the repaired vehicle.' 5 In 2012, the supreme
court extended that interpretation to damage to real property under
commercial and homeowners policies in Royal CapitalDevelopment, LLC
v. Maryland Casualty Co.' The court held that its ruling in Mabry "is
not limited by the type of property insured, but rather speaks generally
to the measure of damages an insurer is obligated to pay.""

11. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. North, 311 Ga. App. 281,284-86,714 S.E.2d 428,
431-32 (2011).
12. Bituminous Ins. Co. v. Coker, 314 Ga. App. 30, 34-35, 722 S.E.2d 879, 883 (2012).
13. Durrah v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 312 Ga. App. 49, 50-51, 717 S.E.2d 554,55556 (2011).
14. 274 Ga. 498, 556 S.E.2d 114(2001). For a discussion of the decision in Mabry, see
Bradley S. Wolff, et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 54 MERCER L. REV. 341,
342-46 (2002).
15. Mabry, 274 Ga. at 508, 556 S.E.2d at 122.
16. 291 Ga. 262,266-67,728 S.E.2d 234,237-38(2012). The court answered a certified

question presented by the Eleventh Circuit in Royal Capital Development, LLC v.
MarylandCasualty Co., 659 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 2012). The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ceorgia had previously held that diminution-of-value damages
were not available under the policy insuring real property, deciding to extend Mabry
because it dealt exclusively with a consumer automobile policy. Royal Cap. Dev. LLC v.

Maryland Cas. Co., No. 1:10-CV-1275-RLV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133911, at *7-8 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 2, 2010). For a discussion of the district court's ruling, see Schatz, supranote 1,
at 177.
17. Royal CapitalDev., 291 Ga. at 263, 728 S.E.2d at 235.
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In reaching its decision, the court adhered to the principle that
damages should be measured in a manher that makes the insured
whole-that is, to place the insured in the same position it would have
been in had the injury never occurred. 8 When damage to real property
occurs, the policy promises to pay for the insured's loss, which includes
loss of both utility of the property and its value. 9 "Although unusual,
it may sometimes be appropriate, in order to make [an] injured party
whole," to award 20both cost of repairs and diminution of value for
damaged property.
How this decision will affect the insurance industry remains to be
seen. The insured will have the burden of proof to show that repairs to
its real property create a "stigma" that entitles it to diminution in
value.2 1 Real estate appraisers likely will need to satisfy such burden
of proof. As acknowledged by the court, diminution of value to property
is "unusual."2 For example, if an insurer pays to replace a roof due to
hail damage, the new roof is an improvement to property that does not
create a stigma necessitating an additional payment of diminution in
value.
The court also acknowledged that its decision is based upon its
interpretation of the policy language; whether diminution of value is
recoverable "depends on the specific language of the contract itself."'
Because the court did not cite to any public policy rationale, property
insurers may begin to find ways to prevent coverage for diminution of
value-both through the policy definition of loss and through a specific
exclusion.
B.

Suit Limitation Provision
In White v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,' the supreme court
answered a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit,25 holding that a one-year suit limitation
provision in a homeowners insurance policy is enforceable for claims not
involving a fire loss.26 State Farm's policy contained a provision
requiring its insured to file a lawsuit "within one year of the date of loss

18. Id. at 264, 728 S.E.2d at 236.
19. Id. at 267, 728 S.E.2d at 237-38.
20. Id. at 265, 728 S.E.2d at 236 (quoting John Thurmond & Assoc. v. Kennedy, 284
Ga. 469, 472 n.2, 668 S.E.2d 666, 669 n.2 (2008)).
21. Id. at 264, 728 S.E.2d at 236.
22. Id. at 265, 728 S.E.2d at 236.
23. Id. at 267, 728 S.E.2d at 238.
24. 291 Ga. 306, 728 S.E.2d 685 (2012).
25. White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 664 F.3d 860, 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
26. White, 291 Ga. at 309, 728 S.E.2d at 687-88.
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or damage." 7 After the insured made a claim for a theft loss, State
Farm denied the claim, and the insured filed suit against State Farm
more than one year after the date of loss.28 In 2006, the Insurance
Commissioner issued a regulation that forbade any property insurance
policy covering loss or damage to real or personal property from
requiring a suit to be filed against the insurer within a time less
favorable to the insured than specified in the Standard Fire Policy.29
The Standard Fire Policy only requires a lawsuit to be brought within
two years of the date of loss. 0 The court held that the Insurance
Commissioner did not have the authority to enact the regulation with
respect to non-fire losses."' Therefore, the one-year suit limitation
provision in State Farm's policy was enforceable on the insured's theft
claim, and the insured's lawsuit was barred because he failed to file suit
within the requisite one year. 2 Based upon this decision, the Insurance Commissioner's regulation will remain enforceable for fire losses,
but not for other property losses; that is, the two-year suit limitation
provision will only apply to fire claims.'
During the survey period (and before White was decided), the Eleventh
Circuit also addressed a suit-limitation provision in Jenkins v. Allstate
Property & Casualty Insurance Co." Allstate's policy contained a
provision requiring its insured to file a lawsuit "within one year after the
inception of loss or damage."' After the insured made a claim for fire
and subsequent theft, Allstate denied the claim, and the insured filed
suit against Allstate more than two years after the losses. Both parties
conceded that the one-year suit limitation provision was invalid because
it conflicted with state law at the time of the losses. The insured
contended that since the limitation provision was void, there should be
no contractual limitation period; consequently, the six-year statute of
limitations for breach of simple contract should apply. 6 Allstate's
policy, though, contained a conformity provision, which stated that
"[w]hen the policy provisions conflict with the statutes of the state in

27. Id. at 306-07, 728 S.E.2d at 686.
28. Id. at 307, 728 S.E.2d at 686.
29. Id.; see also Ga. R. & Regs., 120-2-20-.02 (2012).
30. White, 291 Ga. at 307, 728 S.E.2d at 686; see also Ga. R. & Regs., 120-2-19-.01

(2012).
31. White, 291 Ga. at 309, 728 S.E.2d at 687.
32. Id. at 309, 728 S.E.2d at 687-88.
33. Id.
34. 448 F. App'x 977 (11th Cir. 2011). For a discussion of the district court's decision,
see Schatz, supra note 1, at 176-77.
35. Jenkins, 448 F. App'x at 978.
36. Id. at 977-79.
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which the residence premises is located, the provisions are amended to
conform to such statutes."7 In rejecting the insured's argument, the
court held that the conformity provision amended the policy's one-year
suit limitation provision to include the38two-year suit limitation provision
set forth in the Standard Fire Policy.
C. Subrogation
In Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. v. Woodcraft by MacDonald,Inc., 9
the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a commercial property insurer's
right to subrogation does not deprive the insured of its right to recovery
under the full-compensation or made-whole doctrine.4 ° The insurer
exhausted its limits under a commercial property policy in paying the
insureds for a loss arising out of an explosion to the insureds' building.
The insurer then asserted a subrogation lawsuit against the tortfeasor.
The insurance company subsequently reached a settlement in principle
with the tortfeasor, in which it agreed that the insureds could continue
to pursue their claims against the tortfeasor. The insureds filed suit
against the insurer for breach of the insurance contract for failing to
make them whole prior to settling its subrogation claim with the
tortfeasor.4 1 The insureds contended the settlement impaired or
impeded their ability to pursue the tortfeasor because they could not
afford to litigate their claims on their own.42 The court concluded that
Georgia's public policy does not require that an insurer must first be
certain43 that its insureds are made whole before settling its subrogation
claim.

[TIo bar subrogation in this case [where the insureds simply determined they could not afford to litigate against the tortfeasor] would
defeat one of the equitable purposes of subrogation: to deter wrongdoing by placing the ultimate responsibility for paying an obligation on
the person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay for it."

37. Id. at 978.
38. Id. at 979.
39. 315 Ga. App. 331, 726 S.E.2d 793 (2012).
40. Id. at 341-42, 726 S.E.2d at 799-800.
41. Id. at 332-34, 726 S.E.2d at 794-95.
42. Id. at 339-40, 726 S.E.2d at 799.
43. Id. at 340-41, 726 S.E.2d at 799.
44. Id. at 341, 726 S.E.2d at 800 (quoting Landrum v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 241
Ga. App. 787, 789, 527 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2000) (alteration in original)).
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III.

EXTRACONTRACTUAL LABILITY

In Southern General Insurance Co. v. Wellstar Health System, 45 a
panel of the Georgia Court of Appeals considered a liability carrier's plea
that it was impermissibly being called upon to pay sums in excess of its
Southern General Insurance Company (Southern
policy limits.4"
General) received time-limit demands from both Gray (the injured party)
and Wellstar (the hospital lienholder). Gray's attorney refused Southern
General's overture of including an indemnification agreement against
the hospital lien. Ultimately, Southern General paid Gray, not Wellstar.
Wellstar then sued on its $22,047.50 lien.47 In an extended discussion,
the panel concluded that
it is possible for an insurance company to create a "safe harbor" from
liability under Holt and its progeny when (1) the insurer promptly acts
to settle a case involving clear liability and special damages in excess
of the applicable policy limits, and (2) the sole reason for the parties'
inability to reach a settlement is the plaintiff's unreasonable refusal to
assure the satisfaction of any outstanding hospital liens."
Additionally, the court cautioned, should a plaintiff's attorney be
recalcitrant and refuse to give such an assurance, "the insurer would be
free (at that point) to simply verify the validity of any liens, make
payment directly to the hospital, and then disburse any remaining funds
to the plaintiff."9 This panel's opinion and discussion of the creation
of a "safe harbor" is welcomed in an area where carriers seemingly are
in a "Catch-22" situation in handling competing time-limit demands from
multiple limits claimants. While this area drew legislative interest in
this past session, the interest did not yield a legislative solution.,50 This
is an area in need of definitive reconciliation by the Georgia Supreme
Court, the General Assembly, or both.
A sharply contested case concerning the cause of a leak that damaged
"Liquidity," a fifty-eight-foot yacht, gave rise to an opinion defining the
difference between a disagreement and a bad-faith denial of an
insurance claim in Matrix Transport Resources, LLC v. Standard Fire
Insurance Co."' The property insurer was successful in trimming the

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

315 Ga. App. 26, 726 S.E.2d 488 (2012).
Id. at 26, 726 S.E.2d at 489.
Id. at 27-28, 726 S.E.2d at 490-91.
Id. at 31, 726 S.E.2d at 493.
Id. at 32, 726 S.E.2d at 493.
Ga. H.R. Bill 960, Reg. Sess. (2012) (unenacted).
No. CV409-140, 2012 WL 1865410 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2012).
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extracontractual from the ultimate coverage vel non contest.5 2

The

United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
considered and then rejected a claim of "negligent adjustment," holding
that, absent a special duty arising in tort (such as a liability carrier's
fiduciary duty to settle in appropriate circumstances), mere breach of
contract does not also give rise to a claim in tort." When considering
section 33-4-6 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)
(statutory bad faith),5 ' the court found both a reasonable question of
law and a reasonable question of fact sufficient to dispose of the badfaith claim as a matter of law.5" As an independent basis for its
finding, the court noted that an insurer's reliance on the advice of
independent evaluators "whose information is not patently erroneous"
was also grounds for denial of bad faith. 6 This opinion summarizes the
distinction between a bad-faith denial, which will be discussed elsewhere, and a bona fide disagreement amongst the insurer and the
insured on a relevant issue that does not warrant a bad faith penalty.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS POLICY TERMs, EXCLUSIONS, AND CONDITIONS
A.

OCIPPolicy

An Owner's Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) was given broad
application in Estate of Mack Pitts v. City of Atlanta.7 Pitts was killed
by a vehicle driven by an employee of A&G Trucking, Inc., a subcontractor on the City of Atlanta (the CityYs construction project at Atlanta
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. The City entered into a
contract with a joint venture for the management of the project, with the
City's OCIP being made a part of that contract. The OCIP required the
contractor and all subcontractors to (as is pertinent here) procure bodily
injury insurance in the amount of $10 million per person. A&G
Trucking did not, and a sizeable judgment was procured. Pitts's Estate
(the Estate) then sued the City and multiple contractors, wherein it
argued that workers on-site, as well as the companies involved, were
participants entitled to be benefited by the OCIP insurance coverage

52. Id. at *9.
53. Id. at *2; see also Tate v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 149 Ga. App. 123, 124, 253 S.E.2d
775, 777 (1979); Arrow Exterminators, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1340,
1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
54. O.C.GA § 33-4-6 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
55. Matrix TransportResources, 2012 WL 1865410, at *4.
56. Id. at *5 (quoting Haezebrouck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 809,
812, 455 S.E.2d 842, 845 (1995)).
57. 312 Ga. App. 599,605,719 S.E.2d 7, 13 (2011), reconsiderationdenied, cert.granted.
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clause.5" The Estate also dodged the "exclusive remedy provision" by
claiming its cause of action against the City and the various construction
companies was not based in tort for bodily injury but in contract for
failure to procure the required insurance.5 9 The opinion adds significant exposure for failure to procure liability insurance required by
contract. Hence, this case should be watched carefully in the supreme
court this upcoming year.
B.

Disclaimer and Reservation of Rights

Reservation-of-rights letters are often form documents, and therefore
they miss the mark in terms of real communication. In Hoover v.
Maxum Indemnity Co.,6° an insurer's ex post facto attempt to engraft
"late notice breach of condition" to a coverage disclaimer and declaratory
judgment proceeding was rejected.61 The supreme court discussed the
mechanism of a reservation of rights and criticized the insurer's attempt
to rely on catch-all clauses in an attempt to dragnet additional bases of
non-coverage developed after the coverage position was established by
disclaimer.6 The court reversed the court of appeals, holding that a
carrier cannot both deny a claim and then reserve its rights to other
policy defenses later on.63 If a carrier declines coverage, it does so on
the basis it articulates in its disclaimer, and in this instance, the
disclaimer did not include the late notice defense to coverage.
Similarly, in Illinois Union Insurance Co. v. NRI Construction,Inc.,"
Judge Forrester first essayed national law on the point and then
predicted that Georgia would adopt the majority position, which permits
an insurer to recoup defense costs after a successful declaratory
judgment of noncoverage so long as the reservation-of-rights letter
expressly put the insured on notice of the reserved-right-to-recoup
defense expense in the event of a declaration of noncoverage." These
opinions suggest more care should be given to communications concerning coverage, that denial thereof should only be made in certain
circumstances, and that if a disclaimer is made, it should be complete.
Additionally, reservation-of-rights letters, in conjunction with the
preferred approach of undertaking the insured's defense, must explicitly

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 599-602, 719 S.E.2d at 9-11.
Id. at 602, 719 S.E.2d at 11.
291 Ga. 402, 703 S.E.2d 413 (2012).
Id. at 403, 730 S.E.2d at 415.
Id. at 404-06, 730 S.E.2d at 416-17.
Id. at 405-06, 730 S.E.2d at 416-17.
846 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
Id. at 1377.
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and exhaustively set forth the policy provisions in question and the
terms of the reservation such that an insured can make an intelligent
decision regarding accepting a conditional defense.66
C.

Duty to Provide Timely Notice

This year brought a substantipl number of opinions concerning "late
notice" to insurance carriers, with most being resolved as a matter of law
in favor of the carriers." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. LeBlanc68 was typical, involving five defendants insured under several
State Farm policies who had received presuit demands and were served
on December 7, 2007. Defensive pleadings were filed and a defense
position undertaken without carrier involvement. It was not until May
2008 that the insureds bothered to notify their insurance agent of the
pendency of these claims and suits. 69 The court noted that notification
delays of as little as three months, and often less than one year, had
been held to be unreasonable as a matter of law.70 The court must look
to the reason given by the insured for a delay in notifying, and here, it
7
' That,
was "confusion about whether there would be any coverage."
72
delay.
for
excuse
insufficient
an
is
law,
of
as a matter
D.

Duty to Cooperate

The "cooperation clause" in a standard insurance policy was dealt with
on several occasions, and in each instance, the carrier prevailed. State
Farm & Casualty Co. v. King Sports, Inc.7" involved an extremely
well-documented factual pattern of noncooperation ultimately justifying
summary judgment for failure to cooperate against King Sports.74 In
a fact-intensive discussion, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that the insured failed to have any

66. Id. at 1373.
67. See OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Catholic Diocese of Savannah, No. 11-14557, 2012
WL 1939104 (11th Cir. May 30,2012); American Ins. Co. v. Evercare Co., 430 F. App'x 795
(11th Cir. 2011); Illinois Union Ins. Co. v. NRI Constr., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D.
Ga. 2012); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. No Punches Pulled Sec., LLC, No. 1:09-CV-2165-TWT,
2011 WL 3687570 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2011); Hoover v. Maxum Indem. Co., 310 Ga. App.
291, 712 S.E.2d 661 (2011), overruled by Hoover v. Maxum Indem. Co., 291 Ga. 402, 730
S.E.2d 413 (2012).
68. 2012 WL 692665 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
69. Id. at *3.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *4.
72. Id.
73. 827 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
74. See id.
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"substantive" communications with defense counsel-just being available
to communicate was insufficient.75 The court determined King Sports's
noncooperation to be willful and fraudulent in that it unilaterally
entered into a settlement agreement with the opposing party and failed
to cooperate with defense counsel throughout.7" State Farm demonstrated its good faith and diligence in multiple attempts to communicate
in person, by telephone, by correspondence, and by e-mail to secure the
cooperation and assistance of the insured, being rebuffed in each
instance."
Likewise, a jury verdict in favor of the insurer for failure of the
insured to cooperate was affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Vaughan v. ACCC Insurance Co.7" As in King Sports, despite the
insurer's repeated attempts to communicate-by correspondence and
otherwise-to secure the cooperation and substantive assistance of the
insured, the insured's stonewalling led to withdrawal of coverage and of
the defense counsel. 9 The court found unavailing the insured's claim
that it promised to cooperate because that was not credible in light of
the insured's steadfast failure to cooperate up until the point of attorney
withdrawal."
In Lucas v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., ' State Farm's homeowners policy contained conditions requiring the insured to provide
records and documents requested by the company and to submit to an
examination under oath. After the insured made a claim for a fire loss,
State Farm sent at least seventeen letters to the insured or his attorney
outlining these duties and requesting that the insured comply. While
the insured provided some of the documents requested, he did not
submit to an examination under oath before he filed suit.8 2 The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia held that
whether the insured had provided all material documents requested was
a question of fact preventing summary judgment.' However, the court
granted summary judgment on the basis that the insured breached the
policy condition of giving his examination under oath.' This was true
even though the insured requested his examination under oath be

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1373-74.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1375-76.
314 Ga. App. 741, 747, 725 S.E.2d 855, 861 (2012).
Id. at 743-44, 725 S.E.2d at 858-59.
Id. at 744, 725 S.E.2d at 859.
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43666 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2012).
Id. at *4, *6.
Id. at *17-18.
Id. at *21.
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rescheduled two days before the two-year suit limitation period
expired.85 Moreover, the court held that the insured's proffered excuse
that he did not submit to an examination under oath because he suffered
from mental disabilities was insufficient as a matter of law.8 An
important factor for the court, in so ruling, was that the insured did not
notify State Farm that he suffered from any mental illness before filing
suit.87 These opinions, taken together, suggest that where a carrier
demonstrates repeated efforts to secure cooperation, and these are
rebuffed or ignored by the insured, the cooperation clause can and will
be enforced to avoid coverage.
E. ChildcareExclusion
Finding no ambiguity in an undefined term of "occasional," the court
of appeals enforced the Childcare Exclusion in State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Bauman." The Baumans' child sustained a serious
injury while under the care of the insured, Van de Veire. The record
established that the Baumans paid Van de Veire $65 per week for
childcare for four days per week, three hours per day, and had done so
for more than six months."9 The relevant Childcare Exclusion had a
savings clause, which provided that it did "not apply to the occasional
childcare services provided by any insured."' Faced with an undefined
term "occasional," the court of appeals concluded that the question of
ambiguity was a question of law for the court and that four days per
week for months was "most of the time"-not occasional as a matter of
law.9 The efficacy of the modern Childcare Exclusion was further
reinforced in Georgia by this decision.
V. DISABILITY, LIFE, & HEALTH INSURANCE

The distinction between disability caused by "injury" and disability
caused by "sickness" was the subject of several opinions this year.
Generally, benefits for disabilities caused or contributed to by sickness
terminate at age sixty-five; whereas, disability caused exclusively by
injury may extend for life.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at *23.
Id. at *25.
Id. at *28.
313 Ga. App. 771, 774, 723 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (2012).
Id. at 771-72, 723 S.E.2d at 2.
Id. at 773, 723 S.E.2d at 3.
Id. at 774, 723 S.E.2d at 3-4.
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In Saye v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co.,92 the carrier
successfully managed its alleged bad-faith exposure through bifurcation
of a jury trial, although it was tripped-up by a hearsay objection in the
final analysis.9 3 The insured surgeon suffered from Dupuytren's
contracture, which ultimately caused bilateral basal osteoarthritis that
precluded him from performing surgery. Consequently, he sought
disability benefits for a disability caused by sickness, which terminated
after age sixty-five. When he was advised of this limitation, he then
complained that the repetitive use of handheld surgical devices actually
caused his injury. In the trial court's bifurcated trial, the carrier
prevailed with the jury finding that his disability was caused by
sickness. 4 The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the insured's claim
that O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 precluded bifurcation of the breach of the
insurance contract from the statutory bad-faith claim, despite the
statute's provision for a "single action." 5 The majority held that
bifurcation in the O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 context is still discretionary with the
trial court and was warranted here.9" However, in an extended
discussion on the inapplicability of the business records exception to
hearsay, the court reversed and remanded the case. 97 The mere record
of a telephone conversation does not constitute a business record under
Georgia case law or O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14(b). 9' In this particular instance,
the claims adjuster making the entry did not testify regarding the
claimant's alleged statement.9 9 The majority rejected the argument
that there was no showing of harm from a single document that would
warrant a new trial.1"' The dissent noted that this one-word confirmation within the record was merely cumulative and harmless given the
substantial evidence to the same effect from other legitimate sources
properly received at trial. 01'
In Laun v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co.,"0 2 another surgeon was
diagnosed in 2003 with bilateral basal osteoarthritis of the thumbs. 3
He underwent surgery in 2004 and was collecting Sickness Total

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

311 Ga. App. 74, 714 S.E.2d 614 (2011), cert. denied.
See id.
Id. at 75, 714 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 76, 714 S.E.2d at 617; see also O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6.
Saye, 311 Ga. App. at 76, 714 S.E.2d at 617-18.
Id. at 79, 714 S.E.2d at 619-20.
Id. at 78, 714 S.E.2d at 619; O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14(b) (2010).
Saye, 311 Ga. App. at 77, 714 S.E.2d at 618.
Id. at 79, 714 S.E.2d at 620.
Id. at 80, 714 S.E.2d at 620 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
311 Ga. App. 646, 716 S.E.2d 760 (2011).
Id. at 646, 716 S.E.2d at 762.
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Disability benefits when he fell and sprained his right wrist.'0 4
Accident Total Disability provided lifetime benefits, whereas Sickness
Total Disability provided benefits through age sixty-five only.0 5 Laun
The court found no
unsuccessfully argued for lifetime benefits. 1'
ambiguity in the terms of the policy.107 Although the wrist injury was
greater in terms of causing the surgeon's disability than the thumb
injury (wrist: 23%; thumbs: 7%), the court rejected the surgeon's
argument as a distinction without a difference under the policy because
the wrist injury occurred subsequent to the thumb injury; thus, the
disability was caused by the thumb injury for determining when benefits
terminated according to the policy.'0° Taken together, these opinions
suggest that we should read disability policies a bit closer and be
mindful of the distinction in terms of payout between sickness and
accident disabilities, as the benefits vary greatly.
In the related area of successive disability, the carrier again prevailed
as a matter of law in Burnett v. Combined Insurance of America.09 A
2007 fall from a truck initiated the plaintiff's disability claim, which was
followed by a fall from a stepladder in 2009 while the plaintiff-claimant
was still receiving disability benefits from the first fall. While a policy
could have been written differently, this one required successive periods
of disability, not just one continued disability period contributed to by
two injuries"n0 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia, being unable to find any applicable Georgia
authority, surveyed national precedent.'
The court ultimately
concluded that in order to have a successive disability period, the first
period of disability must have been concluded." 2 That did not occur
here; therefore, benefits terminated at age sixty-five, as opposed to being
continued for the life of the disabled." 3
In Lawson v. Life of the South Insurance Co.," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused a credit life insurer's
attempt to transfer the underlying loan agreement's arbitration clause
into a credit life insurance policy to avoid a nationwide consumer class

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 646-47, 716 S.E.2d at 762.
Id. at 646, 716 S.E.2d at 761-62.
Id. at 647-48, 716 S.E.2d at 762.
Id. at 649, 716 S.E.2d at 763.
Id.
No. 5:10-CV-338, 2011 WL 6012523 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2011).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
648 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 2011).
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action lawsuit against it."1 5 The insurance policy did not contain an
arbitration clause." 6 Despite making reference in their complaint to
the loan agreement, which did contain such an arbitration clause, the
claimants did not sue upon the terms of the loan agreement."' Since
the loan agreement did not show an entitlement in or intention to
benefit the credit life carrier, the credit life carrier was not a third-party
beneficiary."' Additionally, since the claimant did not seek a benefit
tied directly to the underlying loan agreement, Georgia case law
concerning the use of equitable estoppel to draw in to the credit life
policy, the arbitration provision was rejected." 9 The court noted that
a mere "but-for" relationship between the existence of a loan agreement
that happened to create the need for the credit life policy in and of itself
was insufficient to engraft upon the credit life contract the arbitration
clause not otherwise existing.!2 Indeed, such a clause was prohibited
by state law.'2 ' This is yet another loss for the credit life industry that
has been successfully pursued for failure to return premiums for policies
that are prematurely
terminated due to disposal of the underlying
122
automobile.

In Flynt v. Life of the South Insurance Co., ' another life insurer
was predictably unsuccessful in trying to engraft a two-year period of
incontestability upon each of its one-year annual group policies, which,
if successful, would have made the two-year incontestability clause
always inoperative."
The deceased obtained promissory notes in
August and December 2003 and again in December 2004. On each
occasion, a group life policy was secured through Life of the South
Insurance Company (Life of the South). In 2006, Life of the South
revised its policy and certificate form to provide a statement that the
insured had not been diagnosed with diabetes, which this deceased had
been diagnosed with ten years earlier."2 First, the carrier claimed

115. Id. at 1175.
116. Id. at 1169.
117. Id. at 1172.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1174.
121. Id. at 1169 n.1; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (2007 & Supp. 2012).
122. See, e.g., J.M.I.C. Life Ins. Co. v. Toole, 280 Ga. App. 372, 374-75, 634 S.E.2d 123,
126-27 (2006) (affirming that under O.C.G.A. § 33-31-9(c), the insured's filing suit against
the insurer for a refund of an unearned credit life premium provides sufficient notice to the
insurer, thereby bypassing the requirement of giving pre-suit notice of an early loan

payoff).
123. 312 Ga. App. 430, 718 S.E.2d 343 (2011), cert. denied.
124. Id. at 436-37, 718 S.E.2d at 348-49.
125. Id. at 431-33, 718 S.E.2d at 345-46.

166

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

that the two-year incontestability clause ran with the issuance of each
annual group policy certifitate.'26 The court held that terms of its own
policy carved out the incontestability clause from the annual contract.127 Next, the court ruled that the carrier's claim that the two-year
period ran anew with each annual group certificate would have the effect
of neutralizing the incontestability clause and hence was ambiguous and
would be strictly construed against the carrier." s The carrier's sole
victory was avoidance of bad faith and attorney fees under O.C.G.A.
§ 33-4-6.121
In McCrary v. Middle Georgia Management Services, Inc.,31 ° an
innocent beneficiary was entitled to retain proceeds of a life insurance
policy despite a well-documented claim that payments for the policy had
been made with embezzled funds.' 3 ' In 2008, Middle Georgia Management Services (MGM) learned from an audit that approximately $2
million of loans were fictitious and that its employee Morris was
probably responsible. Morris brought up this subject with management
visiting the office and asked to be excused to make a phone call. She
left, only to kill herself. MGM sought the proceeds of the life insurance
policy. 2 This beneficiary was innocent and, under existing statutory
and case law, was entitled to receive the funds from the policy even if
the policy was procured with embezzled funds.' 3 The court stressed
that O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c) 3 only carves out an exception to this
general rule entitling an innocent beneficiary to the proceeds to the
extent of the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy." 5 Here,
there was none because the life policy was a term life insurance
policy.3 6 The court rebuffed the counterclaim against MGM for
wrongful death of Morris, which was articulated under O.C.G.A.
§ 34-2-103' (duty to provide a safe workplace) and negligence-for
MGM's alleged failure to make some effort to save Morris from her
intent to commit suicide. 3 ' The court rejected the "safe workplace"

126. Id. at 435-36, 718 S.E.2d at 348.
127. Id. at 436, 718 S.E.2d at 348.
128. Id. at 436-37, 718 S.E.2d at 348-49.

129. Id. at 438-39, 718 S.E.2d at 349-50; see also O.C.G.. § 33-4-6.
130. 315 Ga. App. 247, 726 S.E.2d 740 (2012).
131. Id. at 251, 726 S.E.2d at 743.

132. Id. at 247-49, 726 S.E.2d at 741-42.
133. Id. at 250-51, 726 S.E.2d at 742-43.
134. O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11(c) (Supp. 2012).
135. McCrary, 315 Ga. App. at 251, 726 S.E.2d at 743.

136. Id.
137. O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10 (2008).
138. McCrary, 351 Ga. App. at 252-55, 726 S.E.2d at 743-45.
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argument, finding no allegation that Morris's physical safety was
threatened in the investigation." 9 The court also ruled there was no
negligence because MGM did nothing to create the conditions for
Morris's suicide. 40
Lastly, a carrier finally was able to prevail in Boross v. Liberty Life
Insurance Co., 4 ' probably because of clear documentation that the
insured's beneficiary was well aware of the impropriety of the attempted
reinstatement. 142 Here, there was a history of a failure to timely pay
on a loan that included a mortgage life insurance. A series of communications culminated in Boross sending a check to Liberty after the death
of his father. The insurance company received and accepted the funds
for the past-due premiums for a three-week period. 4" The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, following
Rutland v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,'" found that
an insurance company does not impermissibly retain a payment when
it refunds late payments within a reasonable period of time." Six
weeks was not unreasonable in Rutland as the carrier needed time to
determine the impropriety of the tender.'" Hence, a three-week delay
was not unreasonable as a matter of law. 47
VI.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Arising Out of the "Use" of a Motor Vehicle
Several cases decided during the survey period, involving both
uninsured motorist (UM) and liability coverage, address whether the
injuries arose out of the "use" of a motor vehicle. 4 The issue arising
from these cases was the following- When the driver of an insured motor
vehicle, who is neither the owner nor a relative of the owner of the
vehicle, stops and gets out of the vehicle to see about an injured animal
on the side of the road and is struck by another vehicle while doing so,
A.

139. Id. at 253, 726 S.E.2d at 744.
140. Id. at 255-56, 726 S.E.2d at 746.
141. No. 4:10-CV-144, 2011 WL 4102524 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2011).
142. Id. at *4-5.
143. Id. at *2-3.
144. 426 F. App'x 771 (2011).
145. Boross, 2011 WL 4102524, at *4.
146. Rutland, 426 F. App'x at 774.
147. Boross, 2011 WL 4102524, at *4-5.
148. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Myers, 316 Ga. App. 152, 728 S.E.2d
787 (2012); Dunn-Craft v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 314 Ga. App. 620, 724 S.E.2d
903 (2012); Mough v. Progressive Max Ins. Co., 314 Ga. App. 380, 724 S.E.2d 414 (2012).
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do the driver's injuries arise out of the use of the insured vehicle so that
the driver would be entitled to UM benefits?
In Dunn-Craft v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,' 49 the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on summary judgment
and held that a question of fact existed as to whether the insured vehicle
was involved so that the driver was an insured."50 However, where an
insured was involved in an incident with another motorist on the
roadway and followed the other driver home, where he was shot and
killed by the other driver's father, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
a summary judgment in favor of the deceased's UM carrier on a
wrongful death claim in Mough v. Progressive Max Insurance Co. 5'
The court held that although the use of the other driver's vehicle was
clearly involved in the incident, that use was too remote from the
shooting by her father, who was never in the vehicle, to fall within the
coverage of a UM policy.'52 Additionally, where the vehicle at issue
was a pot-hole patcher used on the roadway twenty-four hours before the
plaintiff lost control of her vehicle when it ran into loose gravel left on
the road by the county "pot-patcher," the use of the pot-patcher was held
to be too remote to impose liability against the county under a waiver of
sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the use of a motor
vehicle. 1"'

In State Farm v. Myers,' the guardian of a disabled ward sued the
driver of a car used to transport the ward, claiming the ward was
sexually abused in the back seat of the vehicle. The driver's insurer
filed a separate action seeking a declaratory judgment, arguing it had
no duty to defend or indemnify the driver.'
The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's summary judgment for the guardian, holding
that the sexual battery in the back seat of a car did not causally arise
out of the use of the car and that the car was "only tangentially

149. 314 Ga. App. 620, 724 S.E.2d 903 (2012).
150. Id. at 622, 724 S.E.2d at 906. The primary issue in the case was whether the
plaintiff driver, who was listed as a driver on her boyfriend's insurance policies, was
entitled to stack the coverage limits of his several policies. The court held that a person
listed as a driver is not the insured, and since the plaintiff was neither the insured nor a
resident relative of the insured, she was not entitled to stack policies for additional
benefits. Id.
151. 314 Ga. App. 380, 383, 724 S.E.2d 414, 417 (2012).
152. Id.
153. See Bd. of Comm'rs of Putnam Cnty. v. Barefoot, 313 Ga. App. 406, 409, 721
S.E.2d 612, 615-16 (2011).
154. 316 Ga. App. 152, 728 S.E.2d 787 (2012).
155. Id. at 152, 728 S.E.2d at 788.
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connected" to the alleged injuries as "the situs of the attack"; thus, the
insurer was relieved of providing coverage for the claim. 56
B.

UninsuredMotorist Coverage

1. Another Twist onAbrohams. Pursuant to the court of appeals's
decision in Abrohams v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Agency,'57 umbrella
and excess liability policies issued before 2009 that provided coverage for
the use of motor vehicles were deemed to include UM coverage equal to
the liability limits, unless the insured affirmatively chose a different
coverage limit or effectively rejected such UM coverage.' 8 In Georgia
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. North,"9 the insurer offered
UM coverage in its umbrella policy which was issued in 2003."6° The
application, which allowed the insured to choose to include UM coverage,
provided that in order to qualify for umbrella UM, the insured's
underlying policy must have UM limits equal to the liability limits for
North, the insured, had five
bodily injury and property damage.'
liability policies, each with UM limits less than the liability limits." 2
the "NO"box on the umbrella application, rejecting
The insured checked
3
UM coverage. 1

After a collision in 2007, North and his wife brought suit against the
driver of the other vehicle and sought UM benefits from Georgia Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance (Georgia Farm Bureau) for the limit of each
of his primary policies plus $1 million under the umbrella policy. The
insureds filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
entitlement to UM benefits under the umbrella policy, despite the
written rejection of such coverage, and the trial court ruled in the

156. Id. at 155, 728 S.E.2d at 789; but see Hays v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 314
Ga. App. 110, 722 S.E.2d 923 (2012). Where the insured's use of his pickup truck to lift
a portable toilet into a deer stand by pulling a rope attached to the toilet through a pulley
attached to the deer stand was "use" of the motor vehicle as matter of law, it precluded
coverage under the insured's homeowners policy for liability to the man injured when this
operation caused the deer stand-and the man standing on it-to fall twenty feet to the
ground. Id. at 114-15, 722 S.E.2d at 917-28.
157. 282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330 (2006); see also O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000 &
Supp. 2012). The statute was amended, effective January 1, 2009, to exclude umbrella or
excess policies from the mandatory requirement that insurers offer UM coverage equal to
the liability limit in all policies of motor vehicle insurance.
158. Abrohams, 282 Ga. App. at 181, 638 S.E.2d at 334.
159. 311 Ga. App. 281, 714 S.E.2d 428 (2011).
160. Id. at 282, 714 S.E.2d at 430.
161. Id. at 281-82 & n.1, 714 S.E.2d at 430 & n.1.
162. Id. at 286 n.3, 714 S.E.2d at 432 n.3.
163. Id. at 283, 714 S.E.2d at 430.

170

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

insureds' favor.'" The court of appeals agreed with the Norths that
the requirement imposed by the policy application, that an insured only
qualified for umbrella UM coverage if the underlying liability policy
provided UM benefits equal to the liability limits, was an impermissible
Accordingly, the
condition not authorized by 0.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a).'
court held that Georgia Farm Bureau failed to properly make UM
coverage available to the insured in the umbrella policy and that his
him to UM coverage
rejection of such coverage was ineffective, entitling
66
up to the umbrella policy limit of $1 million.1
2. Eyewitness Testimony in a No-contact Case. When there is
no contact between the insured vehicle and a vehicle operated by an
alleged unknown tortfeasor, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(2) provides that the
vehicle operated by the unknown person will be deemed to be uninsured
"if the description by the claimant of how the [accident] occurred is
corroborated by an eyewitness to the occurrence other than the
claimant."16 This eyewitness corroboration must confirm the claimant's version of the existence of the "phantom" vehicle and its causation
of the occurrence. 168 In Bituminous Insurance Co. v. Coker,169 the
court of appeals held that when several eyewitnesses testified to the
existence of an unknown vehicle and its presence at the scene, but the
eyewitness accounts conflict with each other and are inconsistent with
the plaintiff's account, the evidence is then insufficient to establish the
plaintiff's statutory burden, and the insurer is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. 70 Because the statute was to be applied literally, the
court also held that non-eyewitness evidence, or the combination of
eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence, was not corroboration
by an eyewitness as required to support the plaintiff's claim, 7'
3. No Renewal Action After Publication Service. A combination
of jurisdictional and procedural rules doomed an insured's attempt to
recover UM benefits from State Farm when she attempted to renew a
voluntarily dismissed lawsuit without first having personally served the
tortfeasor, even though she obtained publication service on the tortfeasor

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
(2007).
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 281, 714 S.E.2d at 429-30.
Id. at 285-86, 714 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 286, 714 S.E.2d at 432.
O.C.GA § 33-7-11(b)(2).
Hohman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 283 Ga. App. 430, 431, 641 S.E.2d 650, 651
314 Ga. App. 30, 722 S.E.2d 879 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 35, 722 S.E.2d at 883.
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and personal service on the UM insurer."'2 The rule established in
several prior decisions is that a judgment against a tortfeasor is a
condition precedent to recovery from a UM carrier.'
Thus, if a
tortfeasor is sued and dismissed from the suit without judgment being
entered, no recovery may be had from the UM carrier. 74 When an
insured is unable to locate a known tortfeasor, publication service may
be effected to satisfy the condition by obtaining at least a nominal
judgment. 17 Publication service, however, does not confer personal
jurisdiction upon the tortfeasor.'" A plaintiff may dismiss a lawsuit
and renew it by refiling within the original statute of limitations period
or "within six months after the discontinuance or dismissal, whichever
is later."7 7 However, only a valid lawsuit can be renewed, and a
complaint that has never been personally served on the tortfeasor is void
and incapable of renewal.'
In Durrah v. State Farm Fire & Casualty,"' the plaintiff timely filed
her lawsuit against the alleged tortfeasor, Hernandez, and served her
UM carrier, State Farm. Durrah was unable to locate Hernandez, but
she obtained an order permitting publication service and had that
service effected. State Farm was personally served. Durrah voluntarily
dismissed the lawsuit and refiled it within six months, but after the
statute of limitations had run. State Farm was again personally served
with the renewal action, but Hernandez was not served. Both Hernandez and State Farm filed motions to dismiss: Hernandez because she had
not been served with the original suit, and State Farm because the
plaintiff could no longer satisfy the condition precedent to recovery by
obtaining a judgment against Hernandez. The trial court granted both
motions." 0 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissals, holding that
the lack of personal service on Hernandez in the original action prior to
dismissal rendered it void as against her and incapable of renewal, and
the plaintiffs inability to obtain a judgment against Hernandez
precluded her from satisfying the condition precedent to recovery of UM
benefits from State Farm.'' The court also rejected the plaintiff's

172. See Durrah v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 312 Ga. App. 49, 50-51, 717 S.E.2d 554,
556 (2011).

173. Moss v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 154 Ga. App. 165, 166, 268 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1980).
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 Ga. App. 437, 440, 626 S.E.2d 628, 631-32 (2006).
Costello v. Bothers, 278 Ga. App. 750, 752, 629 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2006).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (2007).
Costello, 278 Ga. App. at 752, 629 S.E.2d at 602.
312 Ga. App. 49, 717 S.E.2d 554 (2011).
Id. at 49-50, 717 S.E.2d at 555.
Id. at 50-51, 717 S.E.2d at 556.
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argument that a 2006 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 did away with
the necessity of obtaining a judgment against
a tortfeasor as a condition
2
precedent to the recovery of UM benefits.8

182. Id. at 52-53, 717 S.E.2d at 557.

